Abstract: A simple three-sector general equilibrium model has been developed with both male and female labour and factor market distortions. The effects of different liberalized economic policies have been examined on the gender-based wage inequality. The analysis finds that credit market reform and tariff reform produce favourable effects on the wage inequality while the liberalized investment policy becomes counterproductive. These results have important policy implications for a small open developing economy.
Economic Reforms and Gender-based Wage Inequality in the Presence of Factor Market Distortions

Introduction
Gender empowerment impacts the quality and efficiency of decision making and resource allocation, which is relevant for social and economic development. Gender inequality, in terms of access to education, health facilities and credit is a predominant feature of most developing countries. Women also face gender discrimination in the labour market and financial market, limiting the economic progress of countries. The discrimination in the labour market between men and women can be observed in all countries, although it is much more pronounced in the developing countries.
While the manifestations of gender discrimination are multi-dimensional and intertwined, an overreaching phenomenon is gender wage inequality. Gender wage discrimination not only, by itself, represents an inequality, but also is a reason of many other types of gender inequalities.
Low wages for women leads to economic dependence and thereby their lower social status and decision making position in society. The reason(s) for gender wage gap is a very contentious issue and various schools of thought have endeavored to ascribe reasons for the same. The neoclassical view is that free markets, through the competition process, ensure that wage differentials are eliminated. The cultural historians are of the view that gender wage differentials are because of cultural/societal stereotyping of women's work for low-end, less remunerated jobs. Such culture-driven occupational segregation persists even under competitive conditions. Joyce Burnette ( 2008) has, however, through her studies on gender work and wages in Industrial Revolution Britain, concluded that occupational segregation was not the cause of wage gap but a way to shelter women from "the full force of their lower productivity" caused by their less physical strength and child care responsibilities. Another school of thought, championed by Jane Humphries (2009) , propounded that powerful elements in society manipulate the various factors of production to further their wealth and status, which manifests in inequalities, including gender wage inequality.
The size of the gender wage gap varies across countries as well as within the country. In many countries of Asia, Middle East and North Africa, the gap is upwards of 40% in some sectors (Corley, Perardel and Popova 2005) . In Latin America and the Caribbean, most women earn on an average 69% of men's income. In the context of India, gender wage gap at the National level, on an average, for female labour is 70% of that of daily male wage rate in the agricultural sector in India (National Sample Survey, 2004) . Chaudhuri & Panigrahi (2013) have highlighted the findings of the ASI -2009-10 survey, wherein the All India Average Wage per day for female workers was Rs 147/-as against Rs 303/-for male workers
The developing countries have chosen free trade as their development strategy and been vigorously implementing various liberalized economic policies over the last three decades. The ongoing process of globalization must have produced a significant impact on the gender-based wage inequality. These policies change the relative factor prices and lead to reallocation of factors of production among sectors that use them with different intensities and thereby change their employment and wages. Therefore liberalization policies affect the choice of employment between men and women workers and their respective remunerations (UNCTAD 1999).
Several empirical studies have tried to find out the impact of trade openness to gender wage inequality although their findings of the consequences on the inequality have been mixed in nature. For example, Berik 2000 , Fontana and Wood 2000 : Oosetendorp 2009 Dell (2005 , Artecona & Cunningham (2002) , Garcia-Cuellar (2001) have shown that increased volume of trade due to openness has decreased the gender wage inequality. It has been effectively proved by the various studies that economic integration of Mexico in NAFTA since 1994 has caused the expansion of female levels of participation, erosion of the gender gap and increased volume of trade. On the other hand, there are several other studies like Artecona & Cunningham (2001) , Menon and Rodgers (2006 ), Dutta Gupta (2002 ), Fontana (2002 , Berik, Rodgers,and Zveglich (2004) which show that trade openness has increased the gender wage inequality.
Studies like Menon and Rodger (2009), Chamargwala (2006) , Bhattacharya and Rahaman (1999) have concentrated on the impact of different liberalization policies, such as tariff reduction, deregulation of licensing, etc in developing countries like India, Pakistan Bangladesh and South Asian economies. These studies concluded that trade liberalization widened the gender pay gap.
It was found that women are generally more constrained than men from reaping the benefits from the expansion of trade in agriculture.
Most of the work done on gender wage gap and economic liberalization are empirical in nature.
However, there should be a theoretical literature that can be useful in analyzing the consequences of different liberalized economic and other policies on the gender wage inequality in a simple general equilibrium structure and be useful in prescribing policy measures based on the theoretical findings that can be useful for mitigating the gravity of the problem. The theoretical literature in this area has not emerged as yet. However, mention should be made of a paper by Mukhopadhyay and Chaudhuri (2013) (MC (2013) hereafter) which has examined the consequences of trade reform and inflow of foreign capital on gender wage inequality and welfare of the economy.
The present work is different from that of MC (2013) in a number of ways. First, in MC (2013) any convincing explanation as to why the gender wage gap arises has not been provided. Here we have tried to offer quite a few of such explanations in terms of differences in calorie intakes, spending patterns and physiological factors 1 between men and women. Second, while MC (2013) considered a competitive male labour market we have considered a formal-informal segmentation of the male labour market which is closer to reality especially in the context of a developing economy. 2 Third, we allow capital mobility between the female labour oriented export sector (sector 2) and the formal import-competing sector (sector 3) whereas in MC (2013) capital mobility is allowed only between the two informal sectors. Fourth, the present work 1 According to Gustafsson and Lindenfors (2004) most males are stronger than females. See also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sex_differences_in_humans in this context.
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The female labour market in a developing country is also segmented. However, we have excluded female labour in the formal manufacturing sector (sector 3) of the economy owing to the empirical fact that only a very small proportion of the aggregate female labour force is employed in that sector. See also footnotes 4 and 5.
examines the role of the capital market imperfection, which is a salient feature of the developing country like that of ours, in explaining the gender wage differential which is not dealt in MC (2013). Finally, our results are more distinct and free of parametric restrictions that lead to stronger policy implications than their work.
The Model
We develop a simple three-sector, full-employment general equilibrium model for a small open developing economy with four inputs. The four inputs of production are male labour ( M ) , female labour ( F ) , land ( N ) and capital ( K ) . Here capital means working capital.
Sector 1 is an informal sector that produces an exportable agricultural commodity, 1 X (say food), using male labour, female labour and land. Sector 2 is a female labour-oriented informal sector that produces also an export good, 2 X by means of female labour and capital. A classic example of such a sector, in the developing countries, would be the booming garment industry in Bangladesh, which is both female worker and export oriented (Kornick 2005) . A few other such industries are: tea, tobacco and food-processing. 3 Sector 3 is organized formal sector that produces a manufacturing good, 3 X , (e.g. machinery and equipment, transport equipment, basic metals, fabricated metal products etc.) with the help of male labour and capital. This is the tariffprotected import-competing sector of the economy. We exclude female labour in the production of commodity 3 primarily because the percentage of female labour used in the production activities mentioned above is insignificant (see Chaudhuri and Panigrahi (2013) , Table 2 ). The ICMR (2010 , Table 4 .1) report has pointed out that the minimum calorie requirement of a male worker to maintain the same level of productivity or efficiency is higher than that of a female worker. Furthermore, the spending patterns of the male and female workers are significantly different. Women are more likely than men to spend a significantly higher proportion of their income on purchases of goods and services that promote the nutrition, health and general well being of their families (Duncan 1997; Quisumbing et al. 1998; Kurz and Welch 2000) . Men tend to spend most of their income on non-food items and their personal luxury articles like alcohol and cigarettes or reinvest it in their work or businesses (Guyer 1988; Hoddinott and Haddad 1995; Anderson and Baland 2002) .
The physical efficiency of male labour is greater than that of female labour. 6 This difference may arise due to biological difference or the difference in calorie intakes and the resulting nutritional difference between the two types of labour. Indian women are traditionally more concerned 6 This is analogous to the productivity difference between adult labour and child labour. In the literature on child labour the productivity of adult labour has been considered to be significantly greater than that of child labour although in different informal sectors these two types of labour are substitutes. The difference in labour productivities results in their wage differential. See for example, Basu and Van (1998) , Chaudhuri and Dwibedi (2006 , 2007 etc.
about the well-being and nutritional status of their husbands and children relative to those of their own. This may be one of the main reasons why malnutrition is much pronounced among women, especially in the rural areas of the developing economies including India.
If we keep all these in mind it is not unreasonable to assume that in a largely male-dominated working household the male and female workers consume exactly those amounts of food (commodity 1 in the present model) just sufficient enough to maintain their existing physical productivities. 7 The family income in excess of that amount is largely spent on non-food items and luxury goods of the male worker that do not contribute to their productivities.
In mathematical terms, the efficiency of a male worker, denoted m h , is given by
where m c = (minimum) amount of calorie intake by a male labour.
Similarly, the efficiency of a female labour, F h , is
where f c = (minimum) amount of calorie intake by a female labour.
As commodity prices are internationally given by the small open economy assumption, the amounts of expenditures required for m c and f c calorie intakes are also given. This can possibly explain the disparities between male wage and female wage.
8, 9
7 This may not be the case of male workers employed in sector 3 where they receive a high unionized wage which is greater than the competitive male wage in sector 1. If male workers in sector 3 consume more calories than, m c , level the productivity of each of them is likely to be higher than their counterparts in sector 1. However, for simplifying matters and keeping our analysis focused on the gender wage inequality the possibility of such a productivity differential is assumed away. It is extremely important to mention that although the gender wage gap exists the absolute wages and the magnitude of the wage gap in our model are determined by competitive forces.
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The general equilibrium structure of the model is represented by the following set of equations. (1 )
Equations (3) - (5) are the three competitive industry equilibrium conditions.
Here, ji a is the amount of the j th factor required to produce 1 unit of output of the i sector with , , , j M F L K = and 1, 2,3 i = ; i P = the internationally given price of the i th commodity with 2,3 i = . t is the ad-valorem rate of tariff on sector 3. The other symbols have already been defined. Finally, commodity 1 is taken to be the numeraire.
We have assumed capital market imperfection in the economy. 11 The cost of capital in sector 2 is higher than that in sector 3. The relationship between the two interest rates is given as follows. Survey (2011-12) has found that women are mainly engaged in rural areas as cultivators and agricultural labourers and in urban areas, fourth-fifth of the working women are involved in unorganized sectors such as household industries, petty trade and services, building and construction. Women make up just a fifth of the organized sector workforce. Since the proportion of women working in unorganized sector is high, the overall average daily wage rate of women labour gets depressed.
10 Due to existence of imperfections in the market for male labour in the organized sector (sector 3) the male workers receive the unionized wage which is institutionally determined while their counterparts in the agricultural sector (sector 1) receive a low competitive wage. For a theory of determination of the unionized wage in the formal sector one may go through Chaudhuri (2003) and Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay (2009) 
among others.
11 We also consider capital market imperfections in our model. The informal sector firms being unregistered in nature have very little access to the organized credit market. They borrow a lion's share of their working capital from the informal sector lenders. On the other hand, these exploitative lenders due to their easy access to the formal capital market add on, largely, unregulated margins for re-lending to the Complete utilization of different factors of production can be expressed by the following equations. informal sector borrowers. This raises the cost of financing of the unorganized sector. These characteristics of the informal credit market have been adequately described and analyzed in Bhaduri (1977) , Rudra (1982) , Basu (1984 Basu ( , 1997 , Basu and Bell (1991) , Mishra (1994) , Chaudhuri (2003) and Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay (2009) . For a theory of determination of the informal interest rate in a general equilibrium structure, beginning from the microeconomic behaviour of the informal sector lender in an imperfectly competitive credit market, one may go through Chaudhuri and Gupta (2014) .
Substituting this value of 1 X in equation (8) and solving we get
Similarly substituting the value of 1 X in equation (9) and solving we get
There are eight endogenous variables in the system: M W , F W , R , 1 r , 2 r , 1 X , 2 X ,and 3 X and exactly the same number of independent equations, (3) - (10). This is an indecomposable production structure. Some of the factor prices depend on both commodity prices and factor endowments. Therefore, any changes in the factor endowments will affect some of the factor prices, which in turn affect the factor-coefficients. The policy parameters of the system are β , t and K .
The endogenous variables are determined as follows. 2 r is determined from equation (5) (4). So, these three depend only on commodity prices. Then, using equations (8.1), (9.1) and (10) we can find 
where,
The absolute gender wage gap is ( ) a M F W W − implying that the average male wage rate is greater than the female wage rate. The relative gender wage inequality, denoted I , is given by
Here '^' implies proportional change e.g. ˆ( )
The relative gender wage inequality worsens due to any policy changes if ( )ˆ0
Comparative statics
In this section of the paper we attempt to find out the effects of credit market reform, trade reform, and an inflow of foreign capital on the gender wage inequality in the existing set-up. A credit market reform is captured through a reduction in β . A trade reform can be encapsulated through a reduction in the ad-valorem tariff rate, t . Finally, a policy of investment liberalization in this model means an increase in the endowment of the foreign capital in the economy i.e. F K .
Differentiating equation (5) 
Then totally differentiating equation (6) and using (13) one finds
Differentiating equation (4) Using equations (15) - (17) the following propositions can easily be established.
Proposition 1: A policy of credit market reform unambiguously improves the gender wage inequality.
Proposition 2: Trade reform in the form of a reduction in the rate of import tariff unequivocally lowers the gender-based wage inequality.
Let us now explain these results in economic terms. A policy of credit market reform, captured through a reduction in the degree of credit market imperfection ( β ) lowers the power of the exploitative informal sector lenders and hence their ability to mark up interest rate over the competitive rate ( 2 r ). So, the informal interest rate ( 1 r ) falls (equation 6) although 2 r does not change. Then from the zero-profit condition for sector 2 (equation 4) it follows that the female wage ( F W ), rises. Sector 2 expands as the effective price of its product net of capital cost has increased. However, producers in this sector would substitute female labour by capital as the latter input has become relatively cheaper. The expanding sector 2 requires more capital which must come from sector 3 (note that all factors are fully utilized). Sector 3 contracts both in terms of output and employment of male labour for want of capital. Male workers who have lost their jobs in the formal sector that pays a higher unionized wage ( 
Proposition 3:
The liberalized investment policy in the form of inflows of foreign capital unambiguously worsens the male-female wage inequality.
Concluding remarks and policy implications
The gender-based wage inequality in the labour market is a persistent problem across countries, especially the developing ones. The developing economies have been vigorously implementing the liberalized economic policies over the last three decades which must have important consequences on the problem. We have developed a simple three-sector general equilibrium model with both male and female labour and factor and commodity market distortions with a view to examine the impacts of liberalization drives by the developing nations on the gender wage inequality. We have found that policies of credit market reform and tariff reform produce favourable effects on the inequality while the liberalized investment policy becomes counterproductive. The policy recommendations that readily follow from the results are to go for credit market and trade reforms vigorously. But, the policymakers should be careful in implementing the investment reform as it is likely to backfire unless the policy is accompanied by credit market reformatory policies like curbing the power of the exploitative informal lenders by allowing small firms in the informal sector to borrow their working capital from the organized credit market at the competitive rate. This would help these firms to grow and their demand for female labour to pick up significantly. Consequently, the female wage rises that lowers the gender wage inequality. If these supplementary policies are undertaken the liberalized investment policy would not only lead to a balanced growth of the economy but also definitely improve the gravity of the inequality problem.
Finally, it should be mentioned that in the present work we have analyzed the possible outcomes of different liberalized economic policies on the male-female wage inequality in the simplest possible manner. Some of the assumptions like exclusion of female labour in the formal sector of the economy and classification of both types of labour according to their skills and absence of non-traded goods are restrictive. Furthermore, the determination of the supply of each type of labour from the maximizing behaviour of a working household could be an interesting exercise.
Our future research should address these aspects.
